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Abstract
A WIoT is a wireless network of low-power sensing nodes placed on the human body.
While operating, these networks routinely collect physiological signals to send to offsite
medical professionals for review. In this manner, these networks support a concept known
as pervasive healthcare in which patients can be continuously monitored and treated re-
motely. Given that these networks are used to guide medical treatment and depend on
transmitting sensitive data, it is important to ensure that the communication channel re-
mains secure. Symmetric pairwise cryptography is a traditional scheme that can be used
to provide such security. The scheme functions by sharing a cryptographic key between
a pair of sensors. Once shared, the key can then be used by both parties to encrypt and
decrypt all future messages. To configure a WIoT to support the use of symmetric pair-
wise cryptography a key distribution protocol is required. Schemes for pre-deployment
are often used to perform this distribution. These schemes usually require inserting key
information into WIoT devices before they can be used in the network. Unfortunately,
this need to manually configure WIoT devices can decrease their usability. In this thesis
we propose and evaluate an alternative approach to key distribution that uses physio-
logical signals derived from accelerometer and gyroscope sensors. The evaluation of our
approach indicates that more study is required to determine techniques that will enable
ballistocardiography-derived physiological signals to provide secure key distribution.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A WIoT is a wireless network of health sensors positioned on a human body.
In this network these sensors regularly collect and transmit vital signs. As such, WIoT
networks support a concept known as pervasive healthcare. In pervasive healthcare a
WIoT sends vital sign data to an offsite medical professional. In so doing, patient health
can be continuously monitored. This affords individualized plans for medical treatment
and timely diagnoses [3]. For WIoT to be used in this clinical manner, at least two
criteria need to be satisfied. The first criterion is that the integrity of the vital sign
data should not be compromised. This is essential because these vital signs are used to
guide treatment. The second criterion is that the confidentiality of the vital sign data
should not be violated. This is essential due to laws that govern the privacy of patient
data. If these requirements are not met, adversaries can view patient data and adversely
affect patient safety. For example, an adversary within range of a WIoT could connect to
the network with a properly configured transceiver. This would allow for the collection
of communicated vital signs and the injection of fake data. Therefore, it is important to
secure the wireless communications transpiring within a WIoT. This problem must be
solved before these networks can come into widespread use.
In the domain of network security, cryptography is often used to provide secure chan-
nels for communication. Cryptography works by encoding information so that only autho-
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rized endpoints can decode that data. The guarantees afforded by cryptography typically
include confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. Generally speak-
ing, there exist two different types of crypto systems. The first type are symmetric crypto
systems and the second type are asymmetric crypto systems. Symmetric crypto systems
work by providing the same secret information to all communicating parties. This secret
information is known as a cryptographic key. During operation that key is used as a mech-
anism for encrypting and decrypting the data to send. On the other hand, asymmetric
crypto systems work by using something called a public key infrastructure (PKI). In an
asymmetric crypto system every device has two different cryptographic keys. The first key
is a private key that is only known to the device. The second key is a public key shared
to all through the PKI. To communicate data in this crypto system, the information is
encrypted with the public key of the destination. Once received, the destination decrypts
that information using its private key.
In the context of WIoT, symmetric cryptography is often used [3]. Advan-
tages in using this technique include shorter key size and the lack of a need to configure
and maintain a PKI. Both points are important when considering the resource-limited
nature of WIoT sensors. Specifically, these sensors run on battery power and have limited
memory and computational ability. The only device that is more capable within these
networks is the aggregation device that also serves as a gateway between the WIoT and
a wide area network (WAN). This device is termed as the sink. To enable the use of
symmetric cryptography, a protocol for key distribution is required. Some known
protocols include probabilistic key distribution [8], master key based distribution [7], and
Bluetooth pairing [6]. Unfortunately, none of these techniques for key distribution provide
usable security. Namely, the use of pre-deployment in [8] and [7] requires each WIoT
device to be manually loaded with the appropriate key information prior to use. On the
other hand, the use of a Bluetooth pairing approach in [6] decreases usability by requiring
user involvement for additional security properties. To enhance the usability of WIoT, it
would be best if the network could perform key distribution automatically without user
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involvement.
Given that WIoT devices are in contact with the body, we consider using vital
signs to perform key distribution. The general strategy for this approach is to use
the similarity in the synchronously-recorded physiological signals to help transfer a dy-
namically generated key. This would eliminate both the need for pre-deployment as well
as the need for any user involvement. An existing solution that uses this approach is a
protocol called physiological signal based key agreement [3]. Within that scheme a
cryptographic primitive, known as a fuzzy vault, is used to hide the key information during
transfer to the other endpoint. The similarity in the signals then helps that endpoint to
unlock the vault and recovery the key. While depending on this scheme as a foundation,
our approach differs by using accelerometer and gyroscope sensors to derive the
physiological signals. We do not leverage the special sensing hardware present within
the WIoT sensors. We believe this approach to be an improvement because the sink,
which does not have specialized hardware, can now be incorporated into the key distribu-
tion process. If successful, this approach would allow for the entire WIoT to be configured
to use symmetric crypto systems like AES in a plug-n-play manner.
Due to our use of physiological signal based key agreement, our evaluation consists of
assessing how well our derived vital signs could satisfy the design guidelines enumerated in
[3]. This included assessing the properties of distinctiveness and temporal variance.
Both properties determine the degree to which an adversary can circumvent the physio-
logical signal based key agreement scheme. Having sufficient distinctiveness means that
vital signs from other individuals cannot be used to predict key values. Similarly, having
sufficient temporal variance means that future vital signs cannot be used to predict key
values. To perform our evaluation, we first developed a testbed to collect accelerometer
and gyroscope data from a set of participants. The next step was to filter this raw data
into two different signal types, blood volume pulse (BVP) and ballistocardiography
(BCG). Next, the physiological signal based key agreement scheme was followed for each
signal type and aggregate statistics were computed through the use of three different algo-
3
rithms. This statistical information was then analyzed to determine whether our approach
would be successful according to the physiological signal based key agreement criteria.
There are two contributions made in this thesis. The first contribution is the idea
of using vital signs derived from gyroscope and accelerometer sensors to perform key
distribution. The second contribution is an evaluation of that scheme according to the
physiological signal based key agreement criteria. The two types of derived signals that we
evaluate in particular are BVP and BCG. Unfortunately, the results from the evaluation
clearly indicate that while key distribution can be performed, the guidelines for physio-
logical signal based key agreement are not satisfied. This means that our approach is able
to be attacked by adversaries who either acquire data from other individuals or capture
data from the same individual at some different point in time.
1.1 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is formatted as follows. Chapter 2 contains information on
our system model, threat model, and problem statement. Chapter 3 describes related
work on key distribution. Chapter 4 provides background information on physiological
signal based key agreement and ballistocardiography. Chapter 5 details our approach to
key distribution. Chapter 6 provides information on our evaluation and results. Chapter
7 provides a discussion on potential sources of error. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes this
work and concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Models and Problem Statement
In this chapter we focus on describing the capabilities and structure of the WIoT sys-
tems considered in this research. Next, we describe our adversaries and their respective
capabilities. This includes a statement of our assumptions. Finally, we conclude with a
statement of the problem our thesis seeks to address.
2.1 System Model
A WIoT consists of a collection of sensing nodes placed on the body of an individual [2]
(Figure 2.1). While able to have their nodes wired together, WIoTs are usually wireless
in nature. During their operation, the sensing nodes in a WIoT routinely collect data on
physiological or environmental signals. When collected by the sensing nodes, this data
is then forwarded to an aggregation device. This aggregation device, known as the sink,
is the only other type of device existing within the WIoT. Similar to the sensing nodes,
the sink is typically placed on the body. In general, there are a few differences between
the sensing nodes and the sink. The first difference is functionality. Specifically, sensing
nodes are designed to perform simple tasks due to their limited power, computational
ability, and storage. Conversely, the sink is able to perform sophisticated processing while
acting as a gateway between the WIoT and a wide area network (WAN).
Related to functionality, another difference between sensing nodes and the sink are
5
Figure 2.1: A WIoT network
the hardware components they contain. To perform its functionality, a typical sensing
node consists of a battery, memory module, microprocessor, transceiver, sensing unit,
and analog-to-digital converter (ADC) [2]. Similarly, the sink also contains a battery,
transceiver, and ADC. However, the sink may not necessarily contain the same sensing
unit as the sensing nodes. Link layer technologies used for communicating data between
the sensing nodes and the sink include those existing within the industrial scientific and
medical (ISM) band. Examples include, but are not limited to, Bluetooth, Zigbee, and
WiFi [2]. To route communicated data across the WIoT, there exist at least three different
topologies. The first is a single-hop topology in which every node is at most one-hop away
from another node. The second is a multi-hop topology in which many nodes can be
traversed. The third is a so-called star-topology in which the sink exists at the center of
the network with every other node as a connected point.
Within the context of our work, we make a few assumptions about our WIoT. In par-
ticular, we assume that all of the devices are in contact with the body of the individual
wearing the network. Another assumption that we make is that all devices contain the
same sensing hardware. In our case, this means having an inertial measurement unit
(IMU) containing an accelerometer and gyroscope. Finally, we also assumed all WIoT
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communications to be wireless in nature. If this were not the case then the wired connec-
tion between nodes would already provide sufficient security.
2.2 Threat Model
Within our work we focus on developing a scheme for securing the wireless channel used
for intra-WIoT communication. To understand what providing security would mean in
this context, we first identify the capabilities of our potential adversaries. The insecure
system, evaluated from a conceptual standpoint, was one in which information is openly
exchanged between WIoT devices. This means that no cryptographic transformations are
applied to the information in transit and that anyone using the same link-layer technology
and a transceiver can have the potential to be disruptive. The two types of adversaries
anticipated were active and passive. Active adversaries would focus on inserting or modi-
fying information. Passive adversaries would focus on reading the wireless medium to
acquire knowledge about the system or to record physiological data transmitted by the
sensing nodes to the sink. The key concern associated with passive adversaries was the
potential to violate the confidentiality of WIoT data. The concern for active adversaries
was the potential to violate the integrity of WIoT data.
Specific attacks capable of being launched by active adversaries included the injection
of new data, spoofing, the modification of data in transit, and the ability to replay
old communications. The only attack capable of being launched by passive adversaries
was eavesdropping. While these were the attacks forming the foundation for our threat
model, it is important to identify threats we did not address. For instance, one critical
aspect of WIoTs is that they can be used to continuously monitor patient health. This
makes ensuring availability important. However, because we focus primarily on confiden-
tiality and integrity, we do not address denial-of-service (DoS) or resource consumption
attacks. Additionally, we do not consider the exploitation of the software or hardware in
WIoT nodes. Consequently, physical attacks such as supply chain compromise or network
infiltration at the sink were not a concern.
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Further assumptions of ours include that we do not anticipate our adversaries to make
use of side channels to indirectly acquire physiological data. Given our scheme for key
distribution, adversaries might want to do this to enhance their chances of determining the
shared key. Another assumption we make is that the wearer of the WIoT is not actively
collaborating with the adversary. If this were the case, violating our scheme would be
trivial. Finally, the last assumption is that no attacks will be directed between the sink
and its connection to the WAN because that communication is protected by measures
such as TLS.
2.3 Problem Statement
The task of this work is to securely perform key distribution for all devices partici-
pating within the confines of a WIoT. A secondary objective is to ensure that this process
for distributing key information does not require user interaction and can be com-
pleted automatically. With WIoTs emerging as a technology to support pervasive
healthcare, it is important that their data be kept confidential and unmodified. Basing
plans for medical treatment on inaccurate information has the potential to adversely af-
fect patient safety and well-being. Additionally, disclosing medical information without
patient consent is illegal. In an attempt to provide WIoTs with a secure communication
channel, we propose a scheme based on [3] that will use derived physiological signals.
The benefit assumed here is that all devices will be able to be configured provided that
they possess an accelerometer and gyroscope. To validate our approach, we evaluate two
different design goals inherited from [3] called distinctiveness and temporal variance. Both
design goals are meant to guarantee that an adversary cannot gain the ability to reliably
guess keys based on additional information. This would include physiological data col-
lected either from other individuals or from the same individual at some different point in
time.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
Existing schemes for key distribution in wireless sensor networks include the use of pre-
deployment and the use of Bluetooth pairing. In work performed in [8] the authors
describe a scheme for pre-deployment in which a ring of keys are inserted into each sen-
sor prior to the use of the network. This ring, facilitates the use of pairwise symmetric
cryptography if at least q of the keys in each ring for each sensor match. To reduce compu-
tational overhead the scheme reduces the number of these q keys that are used to produce
a single shared key to some upper bound value of s. Because it is not always guaranteed
that at least q keys match between pairs of sensors, this a probabilistic approach. In
work performed in [7] the authors describe the setup of a body area network in which
pre-deployment of a master key is used to ensure secure communication between all of the
sensors. A survey conducted in [1] discusses the basic approach of manually inserting key
information in sensor nodes. Additionally, [1] discusses distributing chains of keys from a
random pool to sensors. This method is the predecessor to the scheme mentioned in [8].
Our proposed approach improves upon both schemes by dynamically generating keys and
facilitating their distribution during network operation without any user involvement.
In work from [6] the authors discuss a scheme for using Bluetooth to pair groups of
devices in a body area network. Additional security properties that the authors focus on
developing include ensuring that the legitimacy of nodes in a formed group can be verified
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through an out-of-band channel and allowing nodes to be added and removed from formed
groups. The out-of-band channel used is a visual channel which requires devices in the
network to blink LEDs to indicate their group membership. Upon this blinking the user
can then know whether all nodes within a group are legitimate nodes belonging to that
group. Our proposed approach does not focus on providing all of the security guarantees
mentioned in that paper. Instead, our concerns are ensuring that key distribution is
performed securely without any need for user involvement among pairs of devices. With
respect to not requiring user involvement, our proposed approach is an improvement.
10
Chapter 4
Background Material
4.1 Physiological Signal Based Key Agreement
As mentioned previously, our proposed approach leverages a scheme for key distribution
described in [3] called physiological signal based key agreement. Dissimilar to the
schemes mentioned in [8] and [7], physiological signal based key agreement does not require
any pre-deployment of key information. Instead, keys can be dynamically generated
and the similarity in synchronously recorded physiological signals helps to perform the
distribution. To distribute a pseudo-randomly generated key, physiological signal based
key agreement operates in a total of seven phases. These include randomly generating
a polynomial of a pre-determined order, synchronously collecting a physiological signal
for a fixed duration, constructing an entity known as a vault, sending that vault over
the wireless medium, reversing that vault to re-acquire the key information, confirming
the correctness of the recovered key, and using the key in the context of a traditional
crypto-system such as AES.
Since physiological signal based key agreement was developed to support pairwise sym-
metric key distribution, the setup occurs between two devices. The first device generates
a key and securely distributes it to the second device. These two devices are respectively
termed as the sender and the receiver. In the first phase, the sender uses a pseudo-random
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number generator (PRNG) to produce each coefficient in a polynomial of a pre-determined
order. When concatenated together as a binary string, the coefficients form an integer
value representing the key to share. In the second phase, the sender and the receiver
synchronously record the same type of physiological signal for the same duration at the
same sampling rate. After these first two phases, a cryptographic primitive known as a
fuzzy vault is then constructed by the sender. This construct is important in the physi-
ological signal based key agreement scheme because it enables the secure exchange of the
polynomial.
To construct the vault, the sender first examines the physiological signal that it had
recorded. Specifically, the sender takes that signal and divides it into five equally-sized
and consecutive windows having fifty percent overlap. Next, these windows of time-series
data are then transformed into frequency-domain data by applying a fast-fourier-transform
(FFT). Once in the frequency domain, the first 32 data points in each window are searched
for local peaks using a local maxima detector. When finding these peaks, numerical values
called features are formed. To construct each feature, the index and amplitude value of
that peak are concatenated together into a single binary string consisting of 13 bits. The
first 8 bits consist of the amplitude value of the observed peak. The next 5 bits consist of
the index value at which the peak was observed. After generating these features, the next
step is to transpose them onto the polynomial.
To transpose these features, each unique feature was provided as input to the polyno-
mial. The result was a collection of two-dimensional legitimate points. The horizontal
value of each point was the numerical value of the feature, while the vertical value was
the evaluation of that feature when provided to the polynomial. After producing these
legitimate points, the next step of vault production in physiological signal based key agree-
ment is to pseudo-randomly generate a much larger set of distraction points. These points
are termed chaff and are generated so that they do not overlap with any existing legit-
imate points or chaff points. Once produced, the chaff points are then permuted with
the legitimate points to form a set known as the vault (Figure 4.1). This vault is then
12
Figure 4.1: A vault according to the physiological signal based key agreement scheme
communicated from the sender to the receiver in the next phase of physiological signal
based key agreement.
To send the vault and ensure the recovery of the key, the sender constructs a message.
This message consists of the ID of the sender, the ID of the receiver, the vault, a nonce
value, and a message authentication code (MAC) formed from the key and an OR
operation on the vault, nonce, and sender ID. In this message the IDs are used for routing,
the vault is used to support key recovery, the nonce is used to prevent replay, and the MAC
is used to confirm key recovery. When sent to the receiver, the vault is then extracted and
the process of unlocking the vault is initiated. The first step taken in the unlocking process
is for the receiver to acquire the features from its recorded version of the physiological
signal. Next, the intersection of these features and the horizontal component of the vault
points is found. This forms a set of two-dimensional points believed to be legitimate
points. Assuming that there is at least one more than the order of the polynomial such
points the receiver can then start the recovery of the polynomial.
To recover the polynomial in the physiological signal based key agreement scheme, a
technique known as Lagrangian interpolation is applied (Equation 4.1). This technique
works by taking the order plus one points and using one of those points as a test point. A
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polynomial of the appropriate order that is capable of linking these points is then formed.
Once re-acquired, the second to last phase of physiological signal based key agreement
is to confirm whether the recovered polynomial is the same as the original polynomial.
To perform this check, the receiver recomputes the MAC that it had been sent. If the
MAC that it computes matches the MAC that it had been sent, the receiver knows it
has correctly recovered the key. If this is the case, the last step in physiological signal
based key agreement is to confirm this recovery with the sender. To do this the receiver
sends a message to the sender containing a different MAC. This MAC is formed from the
recovered key and an OR operation on the nonce, sender ID, and receiver ID. If the sender
can re-compute this MAC with its key then AES can begin to be used in the WIoT.
p(x) =
v∑
j=0
yjdj(x) , dj(x) =
i=v∏
i 6=j,i=0
x− xi
xj − xi (4.1)
4.2 Ballistocardiography
Apart from physiological signal based key agreement, we also leverage two techniques for
deriving ballistocardiography signals. Ballistocardiography signals are related to subtle
movements of the body caused by ejection of blood from the heart muscle as
it beats. When the human body is still, work in [5] and [6] has shown that gyroscope
and accelerometer sensors can be used to detect these movements. By naturally detecting
acceleration and rotation, accelerometers and gyroscopes capture this movement data in
the form of meters/second2 and radians/second, respectively. Upon removing noise from
gyroscope and accelerometer data these body movements should appear.
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Chapter 5
Approach
In this chapter we detail all of the steps involved in our proposed approach to performing
key distribution in WIoTs. As mentioned earlier, the general idea for our approach is to
use accelerometer and gyroscope data to derive physiological signals. Those signals are
then used in the context of a scheme known as physiological signal based key agreement
to perform key distribution. At the abstract level, these are the steps involved. More
concretely, there are four steps. The first consists of collecting the raw sensor data. The
second consists of deriving physiological signals from the raw data. The third consists
of extracting features from the derived signals. The fourth consists of using the features
in accordance with the physiological signal based key agreement protocol. Each of these
steps is described further in the sections that follow.
5.1 Data Collection
Within our approach, the process of data collection is an activity performed synchronously
between two devices in the WIoT. These devices form a pair wanting to communicate with
one another (Figure 5.1). For both devices it is assumed that they have accelerometer
and gyroscope sensors. Initiating data collection occurs when one of the devices in the
pair sends a future timestamp to the other device. Afterward, both devices wait for that
future timestamp to occur in real time as opposed to system time. Upon the future
15
Figure 5.1: A pair of devices wanting to communicate in a WIoT
timestamp, both devices then begin to simultaneously collect triaxial accelerometer and
triaxial gyroscope data from their own sensors at the same sampling rate for the same
timespan. The sampling rate used was 100 Hz and the timespan was 7.68 seconds. The
result of this collection are six streams of data per device. These components are for the
X, Y, and Z axes of each of the two sensors. Measurement units for each of the sensors
across both devices were assumed to be the same. Gyroscope values were recorded in
radians/second while accelerometer values were recorded in meters/second2. Finally, all
sensors were assumed to be properly calibrated prior to the sampling of their readings.
All data collection was performed ethically by having participants review and sign an
approved consent form from the institutional review board.
5.2 BCG Generation
After collecting the raw accelerometer and gyroscope data, the next step was to use that
data to derive a physiological signal for each device in the pair. In our approach, we eval-
uate two different filtering techniques to arrive at those signals. Specifically, we leverage
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work from [5] and [4] to derive blood-volume-pulse (BVP) and ballistocardiography (BCG)
signals. In both cases, these signals relate to subtle motion caused by the expansion and
contraction of the heart muscle. Through sequences of signal processing techniques de-
scribed in [5] and [4], the six axes of accelerometer and gyroscope data from each device
are transformed into a single time-series signal. Applying the technique from [5] generates
a BVP signal while applying the technique from [4] generates a BCG signal.
To derive a BCG signal from the six streams of data for each device (Figure 5.2),
four steps were required according to [4]. In the first step of the BCG derivation, each
of the six streams of data were normalized so that they would have zero mean and unit
variance (Figure 5.3). This meant that each stream would first have its mean subtracted
from all of its data values and would then have all of those values divided by its standard
deviation. This was done to reduce the influence that different scales might have when
filtering the data in later steps. Next, an averaging filter of 35 samples was subtracted
from each normalized stream to remove the presence of slow motions due to other body
signals [4] (Figure 5.4). Following this step, a Butterworth bandpass filter with cut off
frequencies of 4 Hz and 11 Hz and order 4 was applied to each normalized and detrended
stream of data (Figure 5.5). This was done to isolate the BCG waveform for each stream
[4]. Finally, the stream with the highest amplitude response in the frequency domain was
selected (Figure 5.6).
To derive a BVP signal for each device only the three streams of data from the gyro-
scope sensor were required (Figure 5.7). According to [5] the process involved four steps.
The first step was to subtract an averaging filter of three samples from each of the three
streams of data (Figure 5.8). The second step was to apply a bandpass Butterworth filter
with cutoff frequencies of 10 Hz and 13 Hz and order 4 to each of the three streams of
data (Figure 5.9). The third step was to combine the three data streams into one stream
by taking the square root of the sum of the squared components from each stream (Figure
5.10). The last step was to apply a bandpass Butterworth filter to the single stream of
data with cutoff frequencies of 0.75 Hz and 2.5 Hz and order 2 (Figure 5.11).
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Figure 5.2: The six axes of raw accelerometer and gyroscope data from a WIoT device
(BCG)
18
Figure 5.3: The six axes of normalized accelerometer and gyroscope data from a WIoT
device (BCG)
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Figure 5.4: The six axes of detrended accelerometer and gyroscope data from a WIoT
device (BCG)
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Figure 5.5: The six axes of BCG filtered accelerometer and gyroscope data from a WIoT
device (BCG)
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Figure 5.6: Selection of the signal with the best frequency response from a WIoT device
(BCG)
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Figure 5.7: The three axes of raw gyroscope data from a WIoT device (BVP)
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Figure 5.8: The three axes of detrended gyroscope data from a WIoT device (BVP)
24
Figure 5.9: The three axes of BCG filtered gyroscope data from a WIoT device (BVP)
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Figure 5.10: The L2 norm of the three axes of gyroscope data from a WIoT device (BVP)
Figure 5.11: The BVP waveform from a WIoT device (BVP)
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5.3 Feature Extraction
In the physiological signal based key agreement scheme described in [3] features are nu-
merical values used for assessing the similarity of two physiological signals. Features are
critical because without an ability to assess the similarity of two physiological signals, the
physiological signal based key agreement scheme would not be able to perform secure key
distribution. To mirror physiological signal based key agreement, we first divide our time-
series physiological signals into 5 equally-sized and consecutive windows with 50 percent
overlap. In the context of our signals, which consisted of 768 time-series data points, this
meant producing windows on the following index-described intervals: [0, 256), [128, 384),
[256, 512), [384, 640), [512, 768). After dividing our signals into these windows, we then
perform FFT on each window. The result was a collection of 5 windows consisting of
128 frequency-domain data points. Specifically, these data points were amplitude values.
Next, we examined each window for local peaks. This was done by sliding a window of size
32 to a horizontal offset within the window. This offset value was determined by a method
that will be described later. Upon proper positioning at the offset, the sub-window of size
32 in each window was then searched by a local peak detector. The index (i.e., 0 - 31)
and value for each local peak were then concatenated together in the form of a binary
string. The result for each peak was a 13 bit integer value called a feature. The first 8 bits
consisted of the amplitude value of the observed peak, and the next 5 bits consisted of
the index value of the observed peak. To ensure that all binary strings used were integers
and not floats, the amplitude values were scaled by a constant factor and truncated. In
the case of our BCG signals, this factor was a factor of 1. In the case of our BVP signals
this was a factor of 1000. To ensure that this result would fit within the designated 8 bits
the remainder of division by 256 was taken.
To determine the offset at which to position the size 32 windows within our 5 size
128 windows, we evaluated all of the 96 possible placements within the size 128 windows.
This evaluation consisted of assessing the number of instances in which the number feature
matches for signals from the same users in our dataset was greater than the number of
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feature matches between each user and all others in our dataset. For our BVP signals,
this offset was determined to be 79 while for our BCG signals this offset was determined
to be 41.
5.4 Physiological Signal Based Key Agreement
After extracting features from our physiological signals, we then use those features to assess
how well the signals perform with respect to physiological signal based key agreement. This
includes the evaluation of a property known as distinctiveness. This property was assessed
by acquiring aggregate statistics on feature matches between the two signals obtained from
the same users and by acquiring aggregate statistics on feature matches between signals
from each user and all others. These aggregate statistics were then compared. If there were
significantly less distinct feature matches between users than there were for the same user
there was sufficient distinctiveness. Otherwise, there was not sufficient distinctiveness.
The other property assessed was temporal variance. To assess this property multiple
signals from the same user were recorded at different time offsets and feature matches
between each offset signal were recorded. Aggregate statistics on the number of feature
matches for each time offset for each user were recorded in order to construct a plot of
feature matches over time. If the resulting curves did not quickly decrease to have 0
matching features then there was not sufficient temporal variance.
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Chapter 6
Performance Results
This thesis recruited a total of 18 participants. To ensure that sufficient data was collected
for analysis, 10 minutes of gyroscope and accelerometer data were recorded per trial. For
each participant only one trial was performed. After collecting this triaxial accelerometer
and gyroscope data from our participants, a filtering procedure was applied to each 10
minute sample. This filtering procedure was used to convert each sample into either a
BCG or BVP signal. Next, these BVP or BCG signals were each divided into 74 segments
consisting of 768 time-series data points. These segments were then further divided into 5
windows with 50 percent overlap. FFT was then applied to each window in each segment.
Finally, algorithms were applied to the segments and their frequency domain windows to
assess suitability of the BCG or BVP signals for key distribution. Overall, there were three
algorithms for producing the aggregate statistics used in our analysis. These algorithms
evaluated properties such as the degree to which the signals matched for each participant,
the degree to which the signals were different between the participants, and the degree to
which the signals varied over time.
6.1 Participants and Design
In order to acquire sufficient data for analysis, we collected 10 minutes of data per partici-
pant at a sampling rate of 100 Hz. In total, this amounted to 1332 segments. As previously
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Figure 6.1: Histograms for sample population characteristics
mentioned, we recruited a total of 18 participants for the study. This population was ran-
domly sampled from the larger population of undergraduate and graduate students in
the computer science department at WPI. Recruitment in this context consisted largely of
word-of-mouth advertisement and the willingness of individuals to participate when asked.
With regard to the characteristics of the sample population, there were 16 males and 2
females. The ages of the sample population ranged from 19 to 31 with an average age of
24.6 and a standard deviation of 3.7 (Figure 6.1). Half of the sample population had their
data collected in the student commons and the other half had their data collected in the
B17 lab.
6.2 Apparatus and Materials
Participants whom we recruited were asked to wear two LG Urbane W150 smartwatches
(one on each wrist) while accelerometer and gyroscope data were collected during a 10
minute trial. These smartwatches were used as analogue sensing nodes in a WIoT. Having
limited battery power, limited processing capability, and limited memory along with the
ability to communicate wirelessly through WiFi, these devices were regarded as suitable
sensing nodes. During collection each smartwatch simultaneously collected accelerom-
eter and gyroscope data from its physical sensors. According to information retrieved
from use of the Android Sensors API, the gyroscope and accelerometer sensors are those
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present within an InvenSense MPU6515 chip. The accelerometer and gyroscope were au-
tomatically calibrated by using the calibrated form of the sensor available through the
Android Sensor API. The resolution of the gyroscope was 0.0010681152 radians/second
with a range from -34.906586 radians/second to 34.906586 radians/second. The resolu-
tion of the accelerometer was 0.0005950928 meters/second2 with a range from -19.613297
meters/second2 to 19.613297 meters/second2.
6.3 Reducing Noise
To reduce sources of noise, a few measures were take in the design of our study. First, it
was ensured that none of the participants in our study had engaged in physical exercise
prior to experimentation. This was done because an increased heart rate typically results
in more frequent contractions and expansions of the heart. This increased frequency can
result in differently shaped BCG and BVP signals. This is due to blood passing more fre-
quently under the gyroscope and accelerometer sensors, resulting in more frequent subtle
movement. Therefore, to make sure that our BCG and BVP signals were evaluated fairly
when assessing their suitability for key distribution, they were collected from participants
with a resting heart rate. Another measure taken was to ensure that participants did
not make any voluntary movement while we collected their data. Finally, participants
were also advised not to engage in conversation during data collection and to sit in a
fixed chair with their arms resting on a sturdy desk. Preventing conversation was done
to eliminate the influence of any vibrations resulting from speech. Maintaining the same
posture across participants during data collection was done for consistency.
6.4 Procedure for Data Collection
The study procedure was performed in the following way: First the investigator prepared
the testbed apparatus for data collection. This involved powering on both smartwatches,
connecting both smartwatches to a wireless basestation, launching the Android applica-
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Figure 6.2: Testbed for data collection
tion for data collection on both smartwatches, and launching two data collection servers
on a laptop computer connected to the same basestation. Following this setup phase,
participants were then asked to read and sign the consent form that had been approved
by the institutional review board. Next, participants securely fastened one of the two
smartwatches to each of their wrists. If not securely fastened by adjustment of the
strap, participants were asked to slide the smartwatches up their forearms until they were
securely in contact with their skin. Once the participant was comfortable, he or she was
asked to sit in a fixed chair with their forearms resting on a sturdy desk. Finally, the
investigator initiated the data collection sequence by providing a start command to one
of the servers running on the laptop. The participant then sat still for 10 minutes while
their data was collected and streamed to the laptop for later use.
As per the description of the study outlined in the consent form, participants were
allowed to opt-out of the study at any time if they felt uncomfortable. In this case, the
data of that participant was removed since it would not provide a full 10 minutes of
continuously collected data. The data collection apparatus can be seen in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.3: Algorithm for finding matches between two signals from the same participant
6.5 Analysis Algorithms
After applying the filtering techniques mentioned in section 6, the next step was to evalu-
ate the derived BVP and BCG signals with respect to their ability to be used successfully
in the physiological signal based key agreement scheme. To perform this evaluation three
different algorithms were developed to return aggregate statistics capable of indicating
whether the signals would have sufficient temporal variance and distinctiveness. Prior to
executing these algorithms, each 10 minute signal was divided into 74 segments consisting
of 768 data points. Next each of those segments was divided into five 50 percent overlap-
ping windows and FFT was performed on each window. All of the frequency-domain data
for each window of each segment for a signal from a participant was then written out in
order to a CSV file. This allowed the segment data for either of a given participant’s two
signals to quickly be retrieved while the algorithms ran.
The first algorithm developed was one in which the two signals synchronously recorded
from a participant were compared. In particular, the corresponding segments between a
participant’s two signals were each assessed for the number of features that they shared
(Figure 6.3). After iterating through all 74 segments, the average number of feature
matches for a user was then computed. Once this process of evaluation was completed,
the average number of matching features for each user was then determined. In the context
of the physiological signal based key agreement scheme, this information along with the
average number of features shared between a given user and all other users helped to
determine whether a suitable polynomial order existed.
The second algorithm developed was for finding the average number of feature matches
33
between the derived signals of a given participant and those of all other participants. The
was done by comparing every segment from the two signals of a given participant to all
other segments from all other participants. The average of the resulting sum of matches
was then computed in each case. An illustration of the algorithm is shown below in Figure
6.3.
The third algorithm developed was for assessing temporal variance. This assessment
was performed by computing the number of matches between the segments in a signal as
the number of segments between them increased. After computing these offset matches for
every segment in each of the two signals for a participant the average number of matches
for each offset was able to be computed. The result was a collection of averages that
could be drawn on a graph for each participant. In the graph, the number of separating
segments was indicated along the horizontal axis and the number of matches was recorded
along the vertical axis. By representing the results of the algorithm in this visual manner,
the degree to which the number of feature matches would be affected by a given time
offset could be observed. An illustration of this algorithm for temporal variance is shown
in Figure 6.4.
6.6 Evaluation Metrics
This section describes the metrics used in our evaluation of our BVP and BCG signals
for distinctiveness and temporal variance. Specifically, when evaluating distinctiveness we
use the mean, mode, and maximum number of feature matches as our aggregate statistics.
The mean is used to provide a measure of central tendency for the distributions of our
feature matches across users. Namely, our two distributions consist of feature matches for
the same users and between a given user and all others, respectively. The mode is used
to provide an indication of what the most common number of feature matches tended
to be within each distribution. The maximum was used to provide an upper bound on
the number of feature matches within each distribution. These metrics were indicative of
sufficient distinctiveness if all aggregate statistics for feature matches for the same users
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Figure 6.4: Algorithm for finding signal matches across participants
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Figure 6.5: Algorithm for finding signal matches for the same participant over time
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were greater than those for the number of feature matches between a given user and all
others.
To evaluate temporal variance only the mean number of feature matches for each time
offset for a given user was used. In the majority of cases the mean tended to accurately
represent the center of the distribution of feature matches for each time offset. Since the
curves for the mean number of feature matches over time were plotted for each user, visual
inspection was used to assess whether sufficient temporal variance existed. This was done
by observing how long it would take for a significant decline in the number of feature
matches to occur. A significant decline would mean a drop to roughly 0 feature matches
on average.
6.7 Evaluation
To perform an evaluation of our approach, we focus on assessing how well our derived BCG
and BVP signals perform with respect to the design guidelines described in physiological
signal based key agreement [3]. These guidelines were that the derived signals should
have sufficient distinctiveness and temporal variance. Sufficient distinctiveness means
that acquiring signal data from other individuals cannot help to predict the features of a
given individual. Sufficient temporal variance means that acquiring signal data from the
same individual at some different point in time cannot help to predict features for that
individual. While we do evaluate each of our derived signals separately with respect to
this criteria, we also perform a comparative analysis. Ultimately, the results indicate that
while BVP performed slightly better than BCG for distinctiveness and temporal variance,
both signals were inadequate for key distribution.
To evaluate distinctiveness for our derived BCG and BVP signals, we examined statis-
tics computed over the sample population and over the two sub-populations within that
population. The statistical measures that we used in each case were the mean, mode, and
maximum number of feature matches between and for the same participants. As shown
in the distributions of Figures 6.6 and 6.7 and as summarized in Table 6.1, the difference
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Table 6.1: Evaluating the distinctiveness of derived BCG signals overall
between the mean number of features matches for the same participant and the mean
number of features matches between participants for BCG signals was 0.3242 matches.
Given that only an integer value can represent the order of a candidate polynomial in
physiological signal based key agreement, this meant that no polynomial order could be
formed from the mean. In Table 6.1, the mode for BCG did not perform any better. In
fact, it performed worse because it indicated that more features tended to match between
individuals than for the same individual. Specifically, the most common number of feature
matches for the same individual was observed to be 19 while the most common number
of feature matches between individuals was observed to be 20. Finally, the maximum
in Table 6.1 indicated that the largest number of matching features between individuals
was much greater than the largest number of matching features for the same individual.
Specifically, the maximum number of BCG feature matches for the same individual was
28 while the maximum number of BCG feature matches between individuals was 43.
The numerical results for the distinctiveness of our derived BCG signals was not any
better when considering the shape of the distributions shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7. The
shape of these distributions is very similar in the sense that both are left-skewed and have
their shape positioned to cover roughly the same values. The number of occurrences can
be ignored when comparing these distributions because that depended on the algorithms
used for acquiring the aggregate statistics. Naturally, more comparisons are needed to find
the average number of feature matches between individuals, resulting in more occurrences.
Analysis of the distinctiveness of derived BCG signals over each of the two sub-
populations showed similar results. For the B17 lab sub-population, the mean and mode
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Figure 6.6: Histogram of BCG feature matches for same participant (sample population)
Figure 6.7: Histogram of BCG feature matches between participants (sample population)
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Figure 6.8: Histogram of BCG feature matches for same participant (B17 lab)
number of feature matches for the same individual was shown to be slightly higher than the
mean and mode number of feature matches between individuals (Table 6.2). For the mean,
this difference was a positive, but negligible, 0.7761 feature matches. A mean of 19.7958
features matched for the same individual, while a mean of 19.0197 features matched be-
tween individuals. For the mode, this difference was an additional feature match. A mode
of 21 features matched for the same individual, while a mode of 20 features matched
between individuals. The maximum number of feature matches remained considerably
larger between individuals. A maximum of 28 features matched for the same individual,
while a maximum of 43 features matched between individuals. The student commons
sub-population performed worse than both the B17 sub-population and the sample popu-
lation. Namely, both the mean and mode values for the same individual were less than the
mean and mode values between individuals (Table 6.3). Additionally, the distributions
for each sub-population remained left-skewed with roughly the sample population shape
(Figures 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11).
Next, we evaluated the distinctiveness of our derived BVP signals over the sample
population. As observed in Table 6.3, the mean performed worse when compared to the
use of the mean for BCG. For the same individual the mean number of feature matches
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Figure 6.9: Histogram of BCG feature matches between participants (B17 lab)
Table 6.2: Evaluating the distinctiveness of derived BCG signals (B17 lab)
Figure 6.10: Histogram of BCG feature matches for same participant (Commons)
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Figure 6.11: Histogram of BCG feature matches between participants (Commons)
Table 6.3: Evaluating the distinctiveness of derived BCG signals (Commons)
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Figure 6.12: Histogram of BVP feature matches for same participant (sample population)
was 11.5473 while the mean number of feature matches between individuals was 12.167.
Similar to BCG, this difference of -0.6197 was negligible. On the other hand, the mode
number of features for the same individual was greater than the mode number of features
between individuals. A mode of 18 features matched for the same individual while a mode
of 15 features matched between individuals. Similar to BCG, the maximum number of
feature matches for the same individual was considerably less than the maximum number of
features between individuals. A maximum of 28 features matched for the same individual
while a maximum of 55 features matched between individuals.
The numerical results for the distinctiveness of our derived BVP signals was not nec-
essarily made better when considering the distributions in Figures 6.12 and 6.13. As can
be seen in the distribution of Figure 6.11, the number of matching features between indi-
viduals was most commonly either 0 or a number of matches between 3 and 23. In Figure
6.12, the number of matching features for the same individual roughly followed a uniform
distribution from 0 to 22 feature matches. Given that these two distribution shapes were
not necessarily comparable, Table 6.3 was used to evaluate BVP distinctiveness.
When examining the distinctiveness of BVP over the two sub-populations, it was ob-
served that the B17 sub-population performed in a similar manner to the sample popula-
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Figure 6.13: Histogram of BVP feature matches between participants (sample population)
Table 6.4: Evaluating the distinctiveness of derived BVP signals overall
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Figure 6.14: Histogram of BVP feature matches for same participant (B17 lab)
Table 6.5: Evaluating the distinctiveness of derived BVP signals (B17 lab)
tion. The student commons sub-population performed worse than the sample population.
As can be observed in Table 6.4, the B17 sub-population had a mean number of fea-
tures for the same individual that was nearly identical to the mean number of features
between individuals. Additionally, the B17 sub-population expressed the same sample
population trends of having a larger mode number of features for the same individual and
having a larger maximum number of features between individuals. The student-commons
population performed worse with respect to all summary statistics used in Table 6.5.
After evaluating the distinctiveness of the derived BCG and BVP signals across our
populations, the next step was to evaluate the temporal variance of those same signals.
In Figure 6.18 the temporal variance of BCG signals over the sample population can be
observed. Similarly, in Figure 6.19 the temporal variance of the BVP signals over the
sample population can be observed. In both cases, the figures also show the temporal
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Figure 6.15: Histogram of BVP feature matches between participants (B17 lab)
Figure 6.16: Histogram of BVP feature matches for same participant (Commons)
Table 6.6: Evaluating the distinctiveness of derived BVP signals (Commons)
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Figure 6.17: Histogram of BCG feature matches between participants (Commons)
variance for each sub-population. When reviewing Figure 6.18, it was shown that there
was very little temporal variance for our derived BCG signals. In fact, only one participant
from the student commons sub-population experienced a significant decline in the number
of matching features after an offset of 40 segments (i.e., units of 7.68 seconds). On the
other hand, in Figure 6.19 it was shown that there was more temporal variance for BVP
signals. In nearly all instances a gradual decline in the number of matching features over
time was observed.
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Figure 6.18: Temporal variance of BCG signals (red is student commons, gray is B17 lab)
Figure 6.19: Temporal variance of BVP signals (red is student commons, gray is B17 lab)
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Chapter 7
Discussion
As the results indicated, neither our derived BCG signals nor our derived BVP signals
were able to satisfy the design goals stated in physiological signal based key agreement [3].
One potential cause for this poor performance could have been due to an issue in using
the Android Sensor API to sample our sensors. In particular, when a developer uses the
API he or she has the ability to provide a recommended sampling rate by specifying a
delay in microseconds. Unfortunately, the API provides no guarantee that the sensors will
actually sample at that exact sampling rate. Consequently, there are some small polling
inaccuracies that can accumulate over time, especially over a duration as long as 10
minutes. Inaccuracies of this nature could have allowed for more features to match for
different time offsets when evaluating temporal variance. Additionally, these inaccuracies
could also have the potential to reduce the number of matching features for signals derived
from the same individual.
Another potential source of error could have been that we did not use interpolation
to account for the inaccuracy of the Android Sensor API. If interpolation had been used,
we would have been able to artificially simulate a sampling rate of exactly 100 Hz by
filling in any instances of missing points. This would have eliminated any accumulation
of sampling inaccuracies over time. Use of the technique could likely have improved the
number of feature matches for the same individual as well as temporal variance. However,
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we did not evaluate the use of any interpolation functions, so the effect of applying them is
not known. Here we are merely assuming that interpolation would have helped by filling
in missing data.
Lastly, another source of error could have been that half of the data from our sample
population was collected from the student commons. This particular location had far more
sources of background noise present in its environment when compared to the calm
laboratory setting from which the other half of our data was collected. Our evaluation of
both sub-populations ultimately provides some information relating to this point. Namely,
a comparison between Tables 2 and 3 and Tables 4 and 5 ultimately indicate that data
collected from the student commons had lower mean and mode feature matches both
between and from the same individual. Therefore, where we sampled from could have
been a source of error.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In conclusion, our approach of using derived physiological signals to perform key distri-
bution was not successful. While part of this lack of success may be attributable to the
sources of error mentioned in our discussion, it is likely that our techniques may also not
have worked. This might include our use of the filtering techniques mentioned in [4] and
[5] or the manner in which we generated features according to [3]. Regardless, it may
still be possible to achieve secure key distribution through the use of derived physiological
signals. Unfortunately, we were not able to experience such an outcome with our collected
data and testbed and analysis implementations. The results of the physiological signal
based key agreement paper in [3] had demonstrated the ability to perform key distribution
when measuring PPG and EKG signals using dedicated hardware. If derived physiolog-
ical signals can be acquired just as accurately, it should be possible to use them for key
distribution.
Given that WIoT devices reside in close proximity to the human body, it is rather
natural to think of using the data that they regularly collect to help them perform key
distribution in a dynamic way. The benefit of approaching key distribution in this phys-
iological manner is that it can be performed without the need for any user involvement.
As WIoTs become more widespread, ensuring that they can secure their wireless commu-
nication channel in a usable way will be increasingly important.
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To continue work in this domain, it would likely be useful to explore different methods
for both deriving physiological signals and generating features. Once suitable physiological
signal derivation and feature generation methods are found, it would be best to evaluate
their performance in a more active setting. As opposed to an environment in which the
WIoT wearer is still, an active setting would allow for an understanding of how well such a
system would operate under real world usage scenarios. This is essentially what we would
have done had our results indicated a successful outcome.
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Appendix A
IRB Consent Form
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